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Rethinking Epistemic Relativism1
Natalie Alana Ashton 
‘Relativism’ is often treated as a dirty word in philosophy, but relativistic theories are not 
entirely unappealing – they have features which might be tempting if they weren’t thought to be 
outweighed by problematic consequences. My aim in this paper is to rethink both our attitude to 
epistemic relativism, and the basic features of the view itself. I discuss four objections, and use 
them to isolate five constraints on a more plausible epistemic relativism. I then sketch out a view 
which I think meets all of these constraints. This stratified epistemic relativism offers a complex, 
socially-informed picture of justification which accounts for the many different kinds of roles that 
epistemic agents act, and think, in accordance with each day, and can serve as a starting point for 
constructing a more detailed epistemic relativism, which could secure its  appealing benefits without 
incurring the costs traditionally associated with relativist views. 
Keywords: epistemic relativism, epistemic justification, social roles, equal validity, hinge 
epistemology 
1. Introduction
‘Relativism’ is often treated as a dirty word in philosophy. Showing that a view entails
relativism is almost always considered tantamount to showing that it is unacceptable. But relativistic 
theories are not entirely unappealing – they have features which might be tempting if they weren’t 
thought to be outweighed by problematic consequences. My aim in this paper is to rethink both 
our attitude to epistemic relativism, and the basic features of the view itself. If we didn’t already 
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dismiss relativism as unsalvageable, and were open to attempting to secure its benefits, which  
considerations would be most important, and what changes would need to be made? What would 
a functioning version of epistemic relativism look like? 
I begin by explaining the general features of relativism, and specifically epistemic relativisms, 
before suggesting some benefits that a view of this kind could offer. I then explain the general 
formula that objections to epistemic relativism have taken, and categorise four kinds of response. 
I discuss four objections in total, and in discussing each one I isolate the features that an epistemic 
relativism would need to incorporate in order to avoid the relevant objection. Finally I summarise 
these features, and sketch out a view I think has all of them. This view, which I call stratified epistemic 
relativism, offers a complex, socially-informed picture of justification which accounts for the many 
different kinds of roles that epistemic agents act - and think - in accordance with each day. I think 
this picture could serve as a starting point for constructing a more detailed epistemic relativism, 
which would be able to secure the appealing benefits I suggested without incurring any of the costs 
traditionally associated with relativist views. 
 
2. Epistemic Relativism and its Benefits 
Relativist views are those which hold that some particular set of truths or values are relative 
to (or are dependent on, or vary with) some standard (or set of standards), such as individual taste 
or cultural norms. The epistemic form of relativism which we are concerned with holds that 
epistemic justification is relative to some kind of epistemic framework, where an epistemic 
framework is a set of propositions that a given epistemic community uses to distinguish ‘good’ 
beliefs, or those that should be believed, from ‘bad’ ones, or those which shouldn’t be believed. 
Put simply: epistemic relativists (usually) believe that justification is relative to some sort of standard 
of use. This is in contrast to epistemic absolutist views, according to which standards of justification 
remain the same regardless of time, place, culture, and so on. 




this case an epistemic framework), is the first of two key components of epistemic relativism.2 The 
second component is the endorsement of symmetry – the idea that the different possible epistemic 
frameworks cannot be ranked (Kusch 2016: 35). On one interpretation of symmetry, this 
component follows from the first: if all justification is relative to an epistemic framework, including 
justification of propositions or judgements about those epistemic frameworks themselves, then 
there can be no neutral, framework-independent ranking of different frameworks (Kusch 2016: 35). I 
think this is the correct interpretation, as I explain in my forthcomingA. However, as many 
criticisms of relativism focus on a different interpretation of symmetry, known as equality (Kusch 
2016: 35) or equal validity (Boghossian 2006: 1-2), this paper will focus on this second interpretation. 
On this interpretation, all standpoints are equally correct. 
The problems with epistemic relativism have been debated at length (and will be discussed 
in this paper in due course). However I want to spend some time elucidating the benefits of the 
view. I think there are two main benefits to epistemic relativism: first, that it can help us to resolve 
a deep-seated tension in our understanding of our own epistemic position, and second, that it can 
help to cultivate an important intellectual virtue. 
The tension which I think epistemic relativism can help to resolve is between two 
conflicting intuitions that I think many of us have. One is that our resources for evaluating 
epistemic claims are in some sense limited. This intuition is revealed by the persistence of sceptical 
arguments, which often rely on the idea that the evidence available to us (such as perceptual and 
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proprioceptive experiences) underdetermines the beliefs that we use it to support (such as those 
about one’s having hands). 
Despite this idea being very difficult to argue against, few of us accept, or even entertain, 
the sceptical conclusion that our beliefs are unjustified. We thus also have the (conflicting) intuition 
that our beliefs amount to knowledge, and so are not too drastically compromised by our limited 
epistemic resources. This tension is at the heart of traditional epistemology, and so if epistemic 
relativism can resolve it, this will be a significant benefit. 
Wittgenstein’s work in On Certainty (1969) goes some way to helping us to understand this 
tension, and will be at the centre of the stratified relativism which I develop later in the paper. We 
can read Wittgenstein as offering something like the following argument3: 
1) Rational support for a particular proposition must inspire a greater degree of 
confidence than the proposition itself. 
2) By definition, there are no propositions which inspire a greater degree of 
confidence than our most certain beliefs. 
Therefore; 
3) There are no propositions which could rationally support our most certain 
beliefs. 
The certainty with which we regard our most certain beliefs is thus the very same thing which 
makes us worry about them, and the tension we feel when considering scepticism is a product of 
these two seemingly incongruous facts. 
By showing that justification for a belief lies in being relative to the certain-seeming 
propositions which make up our epistemic frameworks, epistemic relativism will explain the 
intuition that our epistemic standpoint is in some sense inadequate. Moreover, as we will see in 
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section 5, it will do this without conceding scepticism, and so will resolve the tension that results 
from this intuition. 
Secondly, I think that relativism can help us to cultivate an important intellectual virtue. 
Empirical data suggests that even the beliefs which we might take to be least controversial have 
been debated at different points throughout history. Without relativism these cases might be 
thought to warrant an attitude of intellectual superiority, because the passage of time seems to allow 
us to think that we have ‘moved on’, ‘developed’ or now ‘know better’. With our improved 
epistemic standpoint - or so the thought goes - we now have justification where those in the past 
did not. 
But there are also cases of what we might call faultless disagreement amongst 
contemporaries, and even amongst epistemic peers, where there is no obvious asymmetry between 
the two disputants.4 In these cases superiority is harder to justify, and starts to seem like intellectual 
arrogance.5 Epistemic relativism supports a less arrogant response to both kinds of cases, because it 
involves recognising that there are multiple sets of propositions which can be justified. Instead of 
promoting the development of intellectual arrogance, it promotes intellectual humility.6 
However it’s important that the type of relativism we endorse doesn’t go too far the other way, 
and fall into intellectual arrogance’s opposing vices of obsequiousness, or servility (Tanesini 2016: 89). 
We will see in the final section that stratified epistemic relativism avoids this trap. It will allow for 
a plurality of definitions of justification that will enable us to explain these disagreements in a way 
which promotes intellectual humility, and guards against both of its vices.   
 
3. Categorising Objections and Replies 
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Untangling the various objections that epistemologists have directed at epistemic relativism 
is essential to rethinking the view. I will discuss four in total. Before I do, it will be useful to explain 
the general formula that these objections take, and to categorise the various general response types 
which are available. 
Each objection points to some (allegedly essential) property of justification that would be 
lost on a relativist view, and reasons on the basis of this that relativism is untenable. The properties 
are: consistency, non-circularity, rational acceptability, and enabling criticism. The objections fall into two 
groups based on which component of the view is thought to jeopardise the property in question. 
The first three properties are thought to be lost due to the relational aspect of the view, and so they 
fall into the first group of objections. The last properties are said to be vulnerable because of 
symmetry, and so are in the second group of objections. 
Regardless of which of these groups as objection falls into, there are four possible ways the 
relativist could react. The first is simply to deny that the property is lost on a relativist view. If the 
property is securable without any changes to the relativist view in question, then the objection fails.  
The remaining responses all concede that the argument for the loss of the relevant property 
succeeds. Accordingly, I’ll call these responses concessive. The concessive responses are outlined in 
the table below.  
Uncritical  Critical - is the property desirable? 
Alter/abandon the view 
(timorous anti-rel) 
Property is desirable 
(cautious) 
Property isn’t desirable 
(temerarious relativism) 
View can’t secure 
benefits 
(cautious anti-rel.) 




The first of our three concessive responses is a timorous response. Timorous responses 
uncritically accept that the property in question is desirable and then either give up the view 
altogether, or alter it so that the property highlighted by the objection can be regained (but at the 




The other concessive responses are more critical. They begin considering whether the 
property in question is really as desirable as the objection suggests. Someone who reaches the 
conclusion that the property in question is desirable will likely take a cautious strategy; they will 
identify exactly why the property is desirable - i.e. what benefits it accrues - and then explore 
whether those desirable benefits can be procured on a relativist view. There are two possible 
outcomes of this deliberation. Either it turns out that it isn’t possible to secure the benefits of the 
property on a relativist view - this discovery warrants what I’ll call a cautious anti-relativism - or it 
turns out that those benefits can be secured on a relativist view - in which case a cautious relativism 
is warranted. 
Finally, a temerarious strategy is taken by someone who concludes that the property isn’t 
desirable after all. This is the most revisionary of the fours strategies, and it allows them to bite the 
bullet and maintain their relativist view in spite of the objection. 
My aim in this paper is to lay the groundwork for the development of a cautious relativism, 
shaped by the concerns of some of the most prominent anti-relativist arguments. This tactic is 
concessive, because it doesn’t outright deny that the properties highlighted by each of the 
objections are lost on relativist views. And it is critical, because I instead try to identify what is 
desirable about each of these properties before thinking about how to secure them. I then treat my 
findings as a set of constraints on a plausible epistemic relativism. I note these constraints 
throughout the next two sections. Then in section 6 I’ll show how a stratified relativism can meet 
all of them. I will begin with the objections which find fault with the relational aspect of epistemic 
relativism. 
 
4. Objections to the Relational Aspect 
There are three main objections to the relational aspect of epistemic relativism. The first 
focuses on the property of consistency, and often elicits a timorous strategy in response. I will deny 




focus on non-circularity, and rational acceptability respectively.  
 
Consistency 
The worry about the consistency – or rather the inconsistency – of justification relating to 
epistemic frameworks is rarely made explicit; most authors only discuss consistency objections in 
relation to truth-relativism.7 Despite this, it’s still the first objection (in my experience) that comes 
to people’s minds. And I think it incorporates a second worry that is more pressing. 
I’ll use Paul Boghossian’s (2006) formulation of the consistency objection, as he is unusual 
in explicitly formulating it with epistemic, rather than alethic, relativism in mind. Although this 
formulation isn’t especially sophisticated - Boghossian himself rejects it immediately - I think it 
clearly articulates what we are worried about losing when discussing this argument, and so it will 
be useful in compiling our list of constraints on epistemic relativism. Boghossian calls the problem 
‘the problem of traditional refutation’: 
Traditional Refutation: The claim “Nothing is objectively justified, but only justified 
relative to this or that epistemic system [or framework]” must be nonsense, for it 
would itself have to be either objectively justified, or only justified relative to this 
or that particular epistemic system. But it can't be objectively justified, since in that 
case it would be false if true. And it can't be justified only relative to the relativist's 
epistemic system, since in that case it is just a report of what he finds it agreeable 
to say. If he also invites us to join him, we need not offer any reason for declining 
since he has offered us no reason to accept. 
(Boghossian 2006: 83)  
The idea then is to offer the relativist two options. She can either say that a statement key 
to her view: “Nothing is objectively justified, but only justified relative to this or that epistemic 
                                                          




[framework]”, is objectively justified – in which case her view is inconsistent (its truth falsifies 
itself). Or she can say that this statement is justified relative to her own framework – and so 
unpersuasive. 
So, there is a clear route available to the relativise to retain consistency. The real worry is 
whether its possible to do this without losing the capacity for persuasion. Consistency and 
persuasiveness are the basic marks of a respectable view in analytic philosophy, so finding that 
these two features are in tension is a legitimate concern, and a timorous response might seem 
tempting. But, as Boghossian points out, there is a way for the relativist to retain persuasiveness as 
well as consistency. As long as she can allow that the statement of her view is justified relative to 
some framework which she and her interlocutor share, then the worry about persuasiveness 
disappears. 
In order to retain both consistency and persuasiveness, and thus meet the minimal 
requirements for respectability, epistemic relativism must therefore allow that an epistemic relativist 
can share some framework with her anti-relativist interlocutors. This is the first constraint on a 




The second objection to the relational aspect regards the loss of non-circular justification. 
This is one is especially interesting because relativism is often suggested to be motivated by 
attempts to avoid circularity, and to retain non-circular justification.8 Nevertheless, the worry about 
non-circularity is raised by Michael Williams (2007). He distinguishes his own relational view of 
justification, which he calls Wittgensteinian ‘contextualism’, from relativism, on the grounds that 
                                                          





relativism relies on circular justification, and his view does not. As we will see, it’s not clear that his 
view does avoid circularity. Still, his explanation of the problem, and certain aspects of his response 
to it, will be useful. 
Recall, again, that the epistemic relativism we’re interested in says that all epistemic 
judgments are made from within a particular framework or set of propositions, and so these are 
the ultimate ‘source’ of justification. The problem Williams flags up arises when we consider what 
justifies these source propositions. If all epistemic judgements we make must be made within our 
epistemic framework, then presumably we judge the source propositions by that framework too. 
Thus the only justification we can get from epistemic frameworks is circular (Williams 2007: 107). 
This objection shouldn’t warrant a timorous response. Circularity isn’t always problematic, 
and so we should be a little more critical before we reject relativism, and instead begin by 
determining why Williams thinks non-circular justification is desirable. It seems that Williams’ 
reason is that non-circular justification gives us a way to revise our epistemic frameworks – his 
defence of contextualism is grounded in the claim that it allows us to question the propositions 
that make up these frameworks, whilst relativism does not (2007: 107). This makes sense. If a view 
renders our epistemic frameworks un-revisable then it will have difficulty explaining epistemic 
progress (or even just epistemic differences across time).  
A temerarious response would suggest maintaining the relativist view even if it can’t allow 
for framework revision. Given the problems we’ve just seen with a view which does this, I will take 
the more cautious approach. As noted earlier, I’m going to defend a cautious relativism, and so aim 
to show that it’s possible to get framework revision even without non-circular justification. 
Although the overall result will be quite different from Williams’ view – he defends a cautious anti-
relativism – many of the details are similar, and so it will make sense to begin with them. 
In short, Williams’s view is that epistemic frameworks don’t need to rely on circular 
justification because their source propositions can have ‘default entitlement’. The idea, which is 




are more certain for us than any other proposition, and so although they cannot be rationally 
supported (because there is nothing in which such support could be grounded) they also can’t be 
doubted. 
Source propositions play a special role in our justificatory practices – everything else turns 
on them like a door turns on its hinges – and so although they are not the source of justification in 
the traditional sense, they do limit it in a way which makes them a legitimate basis for further 
beliefs. Crucially, Williams maintains that on this view these propositions (which are sometimes 
called ‘hinge propositions’, can “acquire a measure of indirect validation [and] can be questioned 
and revised” (2007: 103). In other words, he thinks they can secure framework revision despite this 
apparent lack of support. 
I agree that it’s possible to secure framework revision on a view like this, but don’t think 
we can reasonably describe this view as anything other than relativist. This is because it can be 
shown to involve circular justification after all. We can make both of these points clear with an 
example: 
Ana is an epistemic agent operating within framework A, which has various source 
propositions (A1, A2, and so on). In order for this system to be revised, someone operating 
within it must be capable of questioning some of these source propositions. Ana is 
competent in all of the required ways, and so is capable of revising system A.  
Now, in which framework do the questions which prompt these revisions originate? 
Presumably it needs to be a framework which Ana operates within, so that she can act on the 
questions, but not framework A itself, as this is constituted by the very propositions in question. It 
looks like we need to allow that agents can access multiple frameworks then. Perhaps Ana can also 
access some other framework, B, and use what she learns there to revise framework A. 
At first glance this seems to break the circle – framework A now has some justification from outside 
itself, and so the problem of circularity has been avoided. But if we look more closely, this just 




by a number of source propositions which are default entitled, and these too will also need to be 
eligible for revision. 
We can now ask the same question again: in which framework do the questions which 
prompt these revisions arise? Our options are that they arise in some third framework, and that 
this is revised on the basis of questions from a fourth, and so on infinitely; or at some point we 
must say that a framework justifies itself; or else, we must say that one of the frameworks in the 
chain gets some justification from one of the frameworks to which it also lends justification. 
This trilemma should be familiar: it is the Agrippan trilemma that we’re faced with when justifying 
individual propositions, but scaled up to justification of epistemic frameworks. I take it that the 
infinitist and self-justification options are as unappealing on this larger scale as they are on the scale 
of individual propositions, and so anyone who is tempted by the idea of relational justification 
(whether it is a relativist or a ‘contextualist’ version) will again be pushed into accepting the circular 
option. The contextualist view that Williams describes thus doesn’t secure non-circularity after all 
(and, by his definition, turns out to be relativist after all). 
Cautious anti-relativism hasn’t been successful then, but I think that a cautious relativism 
is still achievable, and can draw from the picture of justification that Williams describes. There are 
two important features of this picture which we can take as constraints on a plausible epistemic 
relativism: the first is that there are multiple epistemic frameworks accessible by a single subject (as 
we saw with subject A), and the second is that justification can move between frameworks in both 
directions. This allows subject A to ‘step’ between, say, framework A and framework B, and in 
each case to draw on propositions from the other framework to inform her understanding of her 
current one. This would work as follows: 
The propositions of framework A (A1, A2, and so on) are most certain, and so cannot be 
revised, within the context of Framework A. However, when in the context of framework 
B a different set of propositions (B1, B2, and so on) are most certain. A subject who has 




both sets of frameworks. The propositions of framework A can be revised in accordance 
with the propositions of framework B, and vice versa. 
It’s important to make clear that this kind of framework revision is rational. If we avoided 
non-circularity only by showing that frameworks were ultimately non-rational then relativism 
would not look much more appealing. And someone could easily be misled into thinking that this 
kind of revision was not rational. I say that rational revision is a two-way process: not only can 
framework A be revised based on framework B propositions, but framework B can be revised 
based on the propositions of framework A, too. The Wittgensteinan view of justification which my 
view is based on requires the propositions which inspire revisions (i.e. those which play the role of 
supporting or doubting a proposition) to be more certain that the propositions to be revised. This 
means both that the propositions of framework A must be more certain than the propositions of 
framework B, and the propositions of framework B must be more certain than the propositions of 
framework A, and this sounds like a contradiction. 
Assuming that there are no true contradictions this can’t be what is going on in the process 
that I describe. One possibility, and the one which leads to the worries about non-rational revision, 
is that only one direction of revisions can be rational. Perhaps the propositions of framework A 
are more certain than those of framework B are the most certain set, and so framework B can be 
rationally revised, but any revision of framework A will be non-rational. If this were the only 
possibility then this would be a problem for my view. However, there is another possibility which 
allows rational revision to take place. 
The other possibility, and the one which I endorse, is that the propositions of framework 
A are more certain than the propositions of framework B relative to framework A. Likewise, the 
propositions of framework B are more certain that the propositions of framework A, relative to 
framework B. There is no contradiction here. Revision can happen in either direction, depending on 






The third worry about the relational aspect of relativism also comes from Boghossian 
(2006). This is a worry about whether epistemic frameworks can be endorsed, and whether the 
beliefs that they support can be rationally accepted. 
Boghossian starts by telling us that - according to his understanding of relativism - 
particular unrelativised epistemic judgements, such as the following, are false: 
1. Copernicanism is justified by Galileo’s Observations. 
(Boghossian 2006: 84) 
This is because they make reference to objective justification, and according to the relativist only 
relative justification is possible. Instead, Boghossian suggests the relativist would recommend we 
modified, relativised versions of these particular judgements, such as: 
2. Copernicanism is justified by Galileo’s obeservations relative to a system, Science, 
that I, the speaker, accept. 
(Boghossian 2006: 85) 
He then points out that a similar argumentative move can be made about basic epistemic principles 
like Observation: 
 (Observation): For any observational proposition p, if it visually seems to S that p and 
circumstantial conditions D obtain, then S is prima facie justified in believing p. 
(2006: 85)  
Just as the particular unrelativised judgement in (1) was (according to Boghossian’s relativist) false, 
because it made reference to relative justification, the general unrelativised principle in (2) is also 
false. 
The crux of the worry is that in order to count as having reasons for our beliefs we need to 
endorse the principles those beliefs rely on, but it’s not clear that we can endorse principles we 
know to be false. So, if the relativist is right about the impossibility of objective justification, we 





One option at this point would be to disagree with Boghossian’s characterisation of the 
relativist position as viewing judgements like (1) as false. Kusch (2009) does this, taking the non-
concessive route of arguing that the relativist would instead view such judgments as incomplete, 
and so denying that rational acceptability is lost on a relativist view.9 
But what if we concede Boghossian’s claim that relativism loses rational acceptability - what 
are our options? In order to see how we should respond to this worry (i.e. timorously or with 
caution) we need to understand what the benefits of rationally acceptable justification are. 
According to Boghossian (2006: 86), if relativists don’t accept the propositions of their own 
frameworks then we can’t make sense of them having reasons (even relative reasons) for believing 
the non-framework propositions that they do. Rational acceptability is important because it 
provides a coherent basis for our beliefs. 
At this point it will be useful to distinguish two different sorts of basis that our beliefs can 
have. One sort of basis is made up of explicit and often articulable reasons - the kind of thing we 
have in mind when we imagine someone consciously considering a judgement like who to vote for 
in a general election. Perhaps some people accept principles like Observation on this sort of basis, 
but I suspect most don’t. What I think is much more common is accepting Observation on an 
implicit, unarticulated basis - in the same way that we (ordinarily) accept that the floor beneath us 
will hold our weight without ever thinking about it.  
This second, implicit basis is what we discussed earlier under the name ‘default entitlement’ 
(see Wright 2004). Put most basically, the idea is that we don’t need rational support in order to 
accept the principles, judgements, or propositions that play an indispensable role in our epistemic 
lives. If not accepting these principles would result “not in an increase in rigour or solidity but 
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merely in cognitive paralysis” then we are entitled to accept them (Wright 2004).  
One worry about this proposal is that is might seem to suggest that the reasons we have 
for endorsing our epistemic frameworks are ‘merely’ practical, or pragmatic, rather than ‘truly 
epistemic’. There are good reasons to question this sort of hierarchy (see Wright 2014) but I don’t 
think we need to. Instead, we can embrace a constitutivist view of epistemic rationality. According 
to such a view, rationality is constituted by our basic framework propositions and principles. 
Wittgenstein points toward such a view himself:  
342. That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain 
things are in deed not doubted. 
343. But it isn't that the situation is like this: We just can't investigate everything, 
and for that reason we are forced to rest content with assumption. If I want the 
door to turn, the hinges must stay put. 
What he is trying to make clear is that we don’t just refrain from questioning our framework 
propositions because it is difficult or inconvenient to question them, but rather because to do so 
would mean abandoning our rational epistemic practices altogether. The fact that “certain things 
are in deed not doubted” is a component part of epistemic rationality. 
Annalisa Coliva (2015) has developed this idea substantially, and points out that if 
rationality is (or species of rationalities are)10 constituted by these unquestionable framework 
propositions, then the idea that they don’t provide an adequate basis for rational acceptability is 
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utterly confused. These commitments are the very fabric of rationality – the thing against which 
rational acceptability is measured – and so the question of whether or not they are rationally 
acceptable is a category mistake. 
This constitutivist approach allows us to secure (epistemic) reasons for belief very easily. 
Even if someone has never consciously considered the truth of basic principles like Observation, 
if they operate with an epistemic framework partly comprised of them they can be said to ‘accept’ 
them in virtue of acting in accordance with them. Whenever an agent believes a proposition which 
visually seems to her to be the case (when circumstances D obtain), or she judges such a 
proposition to be justified, then we can say that she accepts Observation. 
As long as we accept a constitutivist understanding of rationality (or rationalities), then 
either rational acceptability or the benefits of reasons for belief are possible to secure on an 
epistemic relativist view and will remain in the running for offering a plausible understanding of 
justification. As we will see in section 5, a stratified epistemic relativism can meet this constraint.  
 
5. Objections to Equal Validity 
As I said in section 2, I don’t think that equal validity is a necessary - or even coherent - component 
of relativism. I prefer to characterise the symmetry component of epistemic relativism as non-
neutrality rather than equal validity. But in the interest of formulating a cautious relativism in 
response to the most common characterisation of epistemic relativism, I’ll now consider an 
objection to equal validity.11 This criticism focuses on enabling criticism, and my response to it will 
give us the last constraint we need in order to construct a plausible epistemic relativism. 
 
Enabling Criticism 
                                                          
11 And I think that a parallel worry can probably be raised against epistemic relativism 




Although Boghossian’s argument against equal validity is unconvincing in light of the 
discussion so far, I will concede that a related problem does appear pressing. The problem is that 
on a picture where all epistemic frameworks are equally valid we are unable to criticise people 
operating within different frameworks to our own. 
For example, say someone claims to know some fact which we believe to be unjustifiable 
(e.g. that astrology is a reliable way to predict personality traits). We want to criticise her, and we 
want to be able to say that her belief is unjustified, but if she is operating within some epistemic 
framework in which it is justified, then we are unable to do this. 
It’s easiest to see why we value this kind of criticism when we consider beliefs which have 
moral implications. If someone claims, contrary to our moral beliefs, that a particular person is in 
some way less valuable due to their race, or gender, then we want to criticise them; this is partly 
because we feel strongly that their belief is unjustified tout court, and partly because we hope to be 
able to persuade them to change their mind.12 
The loss of this second benefit appears to be the thought behind the anti-relativist views 
put forward by Pritchard and Coliva. Pritchard (2011) and Coliva (2015) both note that accepting 
relativism requires us to accept the possibility of there being two epistemic frameworks (or sets of 
                                                          
12 The objection about enabling criticism is different from the non-circularity objection in 3b, 
above, because (a) it isn’t about criticising the underlying epistemic framework, but instead the 
non-framework propositions which the framework justifies, and (b) this criticism is not valuable 
because it allows us to revise our own epistemic frameworks, but because we want to be able to 
persuade our interlocutors to revise theirs. 
This objection is similar, however, to a problem which Boghossian explores in relation to moral 
relativism – he worries that the kinds of criticism moral relativism can offer us is no more than 
trivial claims about what our epistemic frameworks entail, rather than interesting claims about 




practices) which give rise to different, and conflicting, conclusions about what is justified (or 
epistemically rational). For Pritchard this idea is expressed by the incommensurability thesis: 
Incommensurability thesis: It is possible for two agents to have opposing beliefs 
which are rationally justified to an equal extent where there is no rational basis by 
which either agent could properly persuade the other to revise their view. 
(Pritchard 2011: 269) 
Whilst Coliva expresses it thus: 
[T]here could be—either in fact or in principle—other practices, which would 
determine different notions of epistemic rationality, with their distinctive 
presuppositions, which would be mandated by the very lights of these alternative 
notions. 
(Coliva 2015: Ch4, §4) 
In both cases the idea is that the epistemic relativist’s insistence that different frameworks 
are equally valid means that there is nothing which can be said from within either framework that 
would persuade an interlocutor from the rival framework to change their mind. 
I think the response to this objection should be two-pronged. First, as with the final 
objection to the relational aspect of relativism, we shouldn’t overstate how often we can expect 
this scenario to arise. Although we might often find ourselves in disagreement with others about 
epistemic matters, we have no reason to think that all or even many of these disagreements would 
arise due to using different epistemic frameworks. Instead, some of them might be between people 
using the same framework, one (or both) of whom has just made an error somewhere along their 
chain of reasoning. In these cases their criticism still, in principle, has the power to persuade. 
Coliva claims that on her view this will always be the case, as the propositions that she 
treats as framework propositions are supposedly so basic that we can’t conceive of creatures which 
could lack them (2015: Ch4, §4). She essentially denies the possibility of frameworks other than 





Pritchard makes a similar point, also defending a cautious anti-relativism. He claims that 
even in those cases where the two subjects seem to hold completely opposing views, persuasion 
can happen as long as they are both sincerely attempting to seek the truth. In those cases where 
one or both parties are instead holding their belief dogmatically (perhaps for religious reasons) the 
debate will be intractable, but for reasons which are practical, rather than epistemic (2011: 20-21). 
I think the general strategy that Coliva and Pritchard share – to limit the number of cases 
of genuinely intractable disagreement – is right, but Coliva’s strategy won’t completely carry across 
to the view that I want to defend, because it doesn’t allow for there to be multiple epistemic 
frameworks. Instead the epistemic relativist can paint a picture of justification on which there is 
‘overlap’ between different epistemic frameworks. By overlap, I mean that there are agents who 
can access two or more frameworks at once, and thus enable criticisms and possibly revision. This 
will mean that in most cases of disagreement, even between subjects operating within different 
epistemic frameworks, there will be at least one set of shared commitments which the subjects can 
use to criticise each other’s systems. There is thus potential for persuasion to take place. 
Once we do this, I think a temerarious response might start to look appealing. If there are 
only a few cases where people are using completely different epistemic frameworks to us, and we 
concede that relative to their own framework they are justified, then criticism starts to look a little 
petty or overly arrogant, and a dose of intellectual humility might be exactly what we need. 
However, I have said that I will not defend any temerarious responses in this paper. Instead I will 
now develop a version of epistemic relativism which meets all of the constraints we have listed, 
and thus avoids the key objections that have been levelled against previous versions. 
 
6. Stratified Epistemic Relativism 
Discussing the objections above has resulted in five constraints, which we can use to sketch 




the benefits of relativism which I introduced earlier, without succumbing to any of the objections 
discussed. For ease of reference, I’ll begin by summarising the five constraints. In order to ensure 
that her view is both persuasive and consistent: 
i. The cautious epistemic relativist must be able to share some framework with her 
critics. 
In order to ensure that epistemic frameworks provide justification that can evolve over 
time (and thus is able to explain epistemic progress): 
ii. Subjects must be able to access multiple epistemic frameworks. And: 
iii. Justification must move between frameworks in both directions. 
In order to ensure that the justification provided by epistemic frameworks is rationally 
acceptable: 
iv. The cautious epistemic relativist must understand rationality constitutively. 
Finally, in order to enable criticism and allow for the potential for persuasion: 
v. There must be multiple areas of overlap between different epistemic frameworks. 
I will now sketch out a view which I think respects all of these constraints. I’ll call this view 
stratified epistemic relativism, because it emphasises the multiple layers, or ‘strata’ of frameworks which 
each epistemic agent has available to them. On this picture, an individual agent’s justificatory 
resources are a cross-section of four different strata of frameworks: 
PURSUIT FRAMEWORKS: The sets of propositions used and developed in the various 
epistemic, or scientific, inquiries and interests that an agent adopts, such as the 
study of history or philosophy. (C.f. Michael Williams’s (1991; 2007) 
methodological contexts and Robin McKenna’s (2011) interests contextualism). 
 
COMMUNITY FRAMEWORKS: The sets of propositions used to play, and developed 
whilst playing, different roles within various communities, such as the role of a 





IDENTITY FRAMEWORKS: The sets of propositions used to, and developed whilst, 
navigating the various forms of privilege one enjoys, and oppression one faces, 
such privilege and oppression relating to race, gender, class, and ability. (C.f. the 
standpoint theories defended by Patricia Hill Collins (1986), Nancy Hartsock 
(1983), Alison Wylie’s (2003), and others). 
 
RATIONAL FRAMEWORK: The broad framework which we all share in virtue of 
being epistemic agents. (C.f. Annalisa Coliva’s (2015) constitutivist rationality.) 
 
My intention isn’t to defend this view. I only want to sketch out a possible version of 
cautious relativism, and so I won’t offer more detailed accounts of each of these frameworks here. 
I will, however, highlight four important points about the picture I’ve just sketched. 
Firstly, as the examples above should make clear, agents will typically have access to 
multiple frameworks within each of the first three strata. For example, one single person could 
have access to the pursuit framework(s) relevant to a scientist, the community framework(s) 
relevant to a parent, and the identity framework(s) relevant to an economically-privileged black 
woman. 
Secondly, the frameworks in the first stratum are, generally speaking, the narrowest, whilst 
frameworks in further strata are increasingly broad, until the single rational framework which is the 
broadest, and encompasses all epistemic agents. 
Thirdly, we should be careful to avoid over-emphasising the significance of this ordering. 
No single framework or strata of frameworks should be considered the ultimate ‘source’ of 
justification, and any framework can be revised on the basis of questions raised in any other 
framework (as long as there is some agent who relies on both frameworks in order to carry out the 




any of the strata being more ‘fundamental’ or more closely allied to ‘genuine’ or ‘objective’ 
justification. 
Rather, we should recognise that justification can move in both directions between 
frameworks, regardless of what stratum they occupy. For example, this process could happen 
between frameworks within the same stratum, such as two community frameworks (parent and 
local councillor), and between frameworks in contiguous strata, such as a community framework 
and an identity framework (e.g. parent and woman), and between frameworks from non-
contiguous strata, such as a pursuit framework and the rational one (e.g. historian and rational 
agent). 
Finally, this picture of justification is complex. I consider this to be a virtue of the view, as 
it means that it reflects the rich and multi-faceted justificatory practices that we actually have. More 
importantly for our present purposes, the fact that on stratified relativism agents can access 
multiple frameworks of different scopes across different strata also allows us to respect the six 
constraints we drew out in sections 3 and 4. I will demonstrate this now. 
As we have seen, stratified relativism allows that epistemic agents can access multiple 
epistemic frameworks. This means that it respects constraint (ii). This feature also makes clear that 
the relativist and her critics will share some epistemic framework – at the very least they will share 
the broad rational framework which all epistemic agents rely on, but chances are that they will share 
plenty of frameworks in other strata too. Most relevant to the relativism debate, they will 
presumably each share a pursuit framework required for philosophy. Thus the view also meets 
constraint (i). 
As I’ve already said, this picture allows for the possibility of justification moving in both 
directions between the different epistemic frameworks. This shows that it respects constraint (iii). 
Furthermore, the broad rational framework ensures that the view meets constraint (v), because it 
amounts to constitutive rationality. Finally, there is clearly a significant amount of overlap between 




agents(s) – and this should be sufficient both to enable criticism of other frameworks, and to allow 
for the potential for these frameworks to thus be revised. Constraint (vi) is also respected then. 
Stratified epistemic relativism thus meets all the requirements for a plausible epistemic relativism. 
 
7. Conclusion 
In closing, I will make explicit how endorsing stratified relativism secures the benefits 
mentioned in section 1. Recall that I highlighted two benefits: one was the ability to resolve the 
tension between two conflicting intuitions about our own epistemic position, and the other was to 
enable us to develop the intellectual virtue of humility. 
Stratified relativism secures the first benefit by staying loyal to the Wittgensteinian picture of 
justification that I described. It says that all justification is relative to a cross-section of different 
epistemic frameworks, and in doing so it acknowledges the intuition that our epistemic position is 
in some sense limited. At the same time, it highlights the fact that these frameworks are made up 
of those propositions which are most certain for a particular agent (in virtue of her pursuits, her 
community, her identity and her status as an epistemic agent). This means that there is a very 
important sense in which the beliefs resulting from this epistemic position are perfectly adequate, 
and so the view also makes room for the intuition that our beliefs amount to knowledge in spite 
of our limited epistemic resources. 
To see this, consider what you would think if someone were to tell you that they were 
absolutely certain of some proposition, but that they didn’t believe a proposition that was entailed 
by it. If anything seems epistemically inappropriate then, I’d venture, this does. In accounting for 
both of these intuitions stratified relativism resolves the deep-seated tension between them, and 
secures the first benefit of epistemic relativism. 
The second benefit of epistemic relativism is also secured by stratified relativism. By 
revealing justification to be a function of the different epistemic frameworks that we each inhabit, 




arrogance which can occur when the possibility of one’s own epistemic position being closer to or 
further from the ideal one is on the table. If there is no objective justification then there is no 
(single) ideal set of justificatory propositions; instead there are multiple, equally valid, sets. 
Importantly, this realisation shouldn’t send us too far towards the opposing intellectual 
vice, either. This is because when the stratified relativist acknowledges the lack of objective 
justification she also specifies that there is no hierarchy to the remaining relativized notions of 
justification. This allows her to increases the importance of other epistemic viewpoints without 
devaluing her own. Stratified relativism thus avoids both intellectual arrogance and intellectual servility 
and obsequiousness, instead striking the golden mean of intellectual humility, and so secures the 
second benefit of epistemic relativism.  
Stratified relativism is a view on which it is possible to secure the appealing, beneficial 
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